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1 Introducঞon
In 1964, at the onset of a transnational left-wing studentmovement, a group ofGerman sociologistsmet in
Heidelberg to celebrate the centenary of Max Weber’s birth, some of them by repudiating his conception
of value-free scholarship (Stammer, 1965; 1971). Summarizing the views of the Frankfurt School contingent
in this regard, Jürgen Habermas declared that Weber’s conceptions of value freedom and objectivity had
resulted from his failure to integrate normative theory and social description. In a diagnosis that would
remain untarnished by remorseless repetition, Habermas argued that this failure was in turn conditioned
by Weber’s acceptance of a neo-Kantian conception of values as objects of pure choice, and a technical
conception of rationality, understood as the instrumental procedures required to reach a predetermined
end or purpose (Habermas, 1971). Weber had argued that it was possible for sociology to provide a value-
free description of a socio-economic phenomenon such as capitalism, including an account of the role of
certain values in its genesis, as in his account of the role of “ascetic Protestantism” in this regard. But he
was emphatic that it was not intellectually honest to draw value-judgments about capitalism from such an
account, or to conceive of society itself as generating such judgments through some kind of reflexive self-
theorization (Weber, 1917; 1949). Should Weber have been right about this, then the whole left-Hegelian
movement that had taken up residence in the Frankfurt School would have been threatened, for this move-
ment was dedicated to the idea that society did indeed throw up the forms of its own theorization and
evaluation. ForHabermas this occurred viawhat he called “learning processes”. Thesewere forms of “com-
municative reason” or public deliberation throughwhich democratic citizenries progressively achieved the
kind of intersubjective agreement about social and political norms that Kant had originally located in the
transcendental consensus of “rational beings” (Habermas, 1981, pp. 8–42).
In what follows it will be shown that rather than being based in a scientific or scholarly investigation
ofWeber’s intellectual sources andmethods, the Frankfurt School critique of his conception of “scientific”
(wissenschaftlich) value-freedom was in fact the brute assertion of a radically opposed “spiritual” outlook
grounded in a sectarian cultural politics. Rather than being a verifiable scholarly account of Weber’s way
of thinking, the thesis that lay at the heart of this critique— the notion that Weber’s conception of value-
freedom was symptomatic of his failure to achieve the dialectical mediation of “positivist” social science
and “decisionist” ethical voluntarism — was a left-Hegelian intellectual weapon designed to eliminate it.
In order to understand how Weber actually conceived of value-freedom, and how this conception came
to be so fiercely attacked by social theorists working with the tools of German dialectical philosophy, it is
necessary to discuss the circumstances of academic combat in which he formulated and defended it, and
also the broader intellectual, cultural and political cross-currents that swept into this context. For these
purposes, the essay will begin with an account of the circumstances in whichWeber presented his famous
Wissenschaft als Beruf (“Science as a Vocation”) lecture to Munich university students in 1917, before
offering a description of the cultural politics involved in the attack on Weber launched by Habermas and
the Frankfurt School.
2 Teen Spirit
AsKeithTribe explains inhis article in this issue of the journal (2018),Weber’s invitation to address students
inMunichwas issued by the Bavarian branch of theFreistudentische Bund (free students’ association FSB).
The key figures here were Immanuel Birnbaum and Alexander Schwab, who themselves formed part of a
radical educational-reform faction of the FSB that included Walter Benjamin. Initially conceived by the
FSB as part of a series in which celebrated German professors would address the theme ofGeistige Arbeit
als Beruf (intellectual work as a vocation), Weber’sWissenschaft als Beruf of 1917 appears to have been
one of only two lectures that actually were delivered, the second being his Politik als Beruf (“Politics as a
Profession”) presented in Munich in 1919, whenWeber had taken up a chair at the university (Mommsen
& Schluchter, 1992).
Standing in opposition to the ultra-nationalistDeutsch-Völkische Studentenverband (ethnic-German
student association), the FSB formed part of the liberal wing of a broader German youth movement that
had begun in the 1890s and grew steadily until thewar years (Dudek, 2002, pp. 7–39). Like the youthmove-
ment of the 1960s, the ﬁn de siècle German Freideutsch or Freistudenten movement consisted of a loose
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coalition of disparate youth groups. In Germany these groups were linked primarily by the fact that their
student members sought an association independent of the official student corps (Bursenschaften), whose
social exclusivity, anti-semitic stance, and ultra-nationalist ethos they attempted to combat under circum-
stances of intense right-left political conflict within theGerman student body (Jarausch, 2014, pp. 333–392).
The liberal student associations were thus “free” in the sense of being unincorporated and open to all, thus
providing an academic home for Jewish, socialist and democrat students (Birnbaum, 1918).
The array of youth groups participating in the Freistudenten or Freideutsche movement can be gath-
ered from the variety of associations that invited German youth to attend a “festival of youth”, held at
Hohe Meißner in Hesse on the weekend of 11–12 October 1913. The invitation printed in the September
issue of a leading youth-movement journal—Der Anfang: Zeitschrift der Jugend—declared that youth
had reached a turning point in its striving for a new form and a conduct of life (Lebensform and Lebens-
führung). This would supersede the culture of the older generation and give expression to the rejuvenated
currents of spiritual life coursing through young German veins, inspiring them to face the highest chal-
lenges of humanity. The host groups listed at the end of the invitation included theDeutsche Akademis-
che Freischar (dedicated to reforming student lifestyles),Deutscher Bund abstinenter Studenten (a student
temperance association), the (life-reforming and pacifistic)Deutscher Vortruppbund, various branches of
theWandervogel movement (free spirits combining a love of nature and hiking with moral idealism), and
the Frei Schulgemeinde (free-school community FSG) (Deutsche-Akademische-Freischar, 1913, pp. 129–
131). Led by the charismatic Gustav Wyneken, who had mentored both Schwab and Benjamin, the FSG
was an educational and lifestyle reform movement dedicated to the idea that youth could best realize its
spiritual potential in isolated rural boarding schools, free from the corrupting influence of parents and the
older generation.
To the extent that this loose affiliation of educational- and life-reformers possessed any kind of intel-
lectual or ideological cohesion it was provided by the manner in which its intellectual leadership sought
to give shape to the spiritual development of youth through German idealist philosophy. This provided
a broadly shared inner culture and spiritual outlook that overlapped with the “liberal” or philosophical
variants of Protestantism and Judaism. Writing under the pen-name of “Ardor”, the 19 year-old Walter
Benjamin thus published an apologia for the FSG in which he argued thatWyneken’s educational reforms
were driven not by any particular politics or program but by the mission of placing “metaphysics” at the
center of schooling. Benjamin understood metaphysics in terms of the presence of an objective Geist or
“objective spirit”, whose bearer was humanity, and to which students must subordinate their individual
subjectivity in pursuit of spiritual insight and community. Declaring that “All ideal goods — language
and science, law andmorality, art and religion— are expressions of this objective spirit,” Benjamin argued
that socialism, evolutionary doctrine, and technology had already transformed the world into an object of
the human spirit, and reminded his readers that “The acknowledged philosophical representative of this
viewpoint is above all Hegel” (Benjamin [Ardor], 1911, p. 80).
Two years later in a discussion of “education and valuation” Benjamin would continue this line of
argument, declaring that German schools were failing to show how cultural history could draw value-
judgments from an account of the way in which law, education, art and ethics had evolved as expressions
of the objective spirit. This was because cultural historywas not being taught in schools, while political his-
tory refrained from value-judgments, and history teaching in general transmitted disconnected facts and
dates from which no developmental tendencies and valuations could be drawn (Benjamin [Ardor], 1913a,
pp. 8–10). The young should thus seek “experience” (Erfahrung) rather than mere factual knowledge.
Theirs would not be the spiritless quotidian experience of the older generation, however, but an experi-
ence that lay beyond experience, in a future that would be untouched by the brutal facticity of the present,
and that the student would find only within his own Geist, where he would enter into community with
the other young spirits (Benjamin [Ardor], 1913b, pp. 169–171).
In the paper “Beruf und Jugend” that he published in a radical literary journal in 1917 — and that
formed part of the immediate context to whichWeber’s lecture responded—Alexander Schwab followed
the same intellectual path as Benjamin, activating the dialecticalmethod of a fully internalizedHegelianism
(Schwab, 1917). He used this method to shape a prophetic persona through which he could discern the
spiritual condition of the age and the future form of humanity. Schwab thus declared that humanity was
driven by two opposed forces, “life” and “idea” (life and spirit, life and understanding). From the former
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1971-8853/8436 139
Science as a Vocation, Philosophy as a Religion Sociologica. V.12N.1 (2018)
flowed all of the powers of life and death, procreation and passion; and from the latter, man’s ethical ideals
and knowledge, his capacity for the creation of beauty and community. The problem of the present age
was that “west-European-American humanity” had lost the capacity to reconcile these two poles that had
been so beautifully harmonized by the Greeks.
Drawing on the same left-Hegelian thought-figures that would reach down to Habermas, Schwab un-
cannily anticipated the latter’s diagnosis of a society governed by a technical rationality and cut off from
the values of the life-world. On the one hand, Schwab argued, aided by Kant’s rationalist destruction of
substantive metaphysics, an abstracted “Ratio” had come to rule over the weakened forces of life, subject-
ing them to amerely technical rationality associated with commerce, politics andBrotstudium, having lost
touchwith the ultimate values embedded in theworld of life. On the other hand, severed from the shaping
force of ennobling ideals, life had become degraded into the meaningless pursuit of wealth and security,
and the crudest of passions and sensations (ibidem, pp. 100–102). Schwab then names Beruf or vocation
as both the symbol and the fact of modern society’s failure to integrate “life” and “idea”, and as the central
obstacle to youth’s striving to realize objective spirit: “Vocation (Beruf ) is the core of our spiritual and
social situation. (Today the war is the dominant instance, but vocation is the core). Vocation is the effect
and in turn the cause of the estrangement of spirit; it is both symbol and fact […] in fact the indelible
characteristic of this west-European-American middle-class world” (ibidem, p. 103).
Schwab’s dialectical figurationof life and idea thus drewaBenjaminian evaluationof culture froma “sci-
entific” account of its structure and development, simultaneously delivering a prophetic insight into its fu-
ture: the eventual reconciliation of the opposed forces of life andGeist. This would not be brought about
by educational reform, social revolution, or the improvement of working conditions, Schwab prophesied,
but only through a “clear knowledge and living feeling for the relation between the simplest fundamental
powers of our existence: life and spirit.” Only thus would it be possible for life to receive the shaping and
ennobling power of understanding without being instrumentalized, and the understanding to be filled
with the “blood and power and sensuous beauty” of life without being enslaved by it: “To grasp the one
as one and as a whole is only granted to an inner intuition, to express it is vested only in prophets, and to
represent it only in artists” (ibidem, p. 106).
3 Weber’s Lecture
ThatWeber regarded the disposition of his Munich audience as largely determined by the cultural politics
of the youthmovement is clear throughout “Science as a Vocation”, but especially so in some remarks near
the end. After castigating academics for failing to face up to their fateful historical situation— inwhich the
scientific disciplines have destroyed all transcendent values and meanings — and for seeking to evade this
situation by claiming prophetic insight and leadership,Weber turned to the “religious” interpretation that
the youth movement had imposed on its community. While avoiding the “swindle and self-deception”
of the professorial prophets, and in fact containing something “sincere and genuine”, nonetheless, “there
is perhaps a misunderstanding of their own significance when those youth groups that, having quietly
grown up in recent years, have ascribed to their own relations of human community the significance of
religious, cosmic ormystical relations […] dubious as it appears tomewhether the dignity of purely human
communal relations is elevated by such religious interpretations” (Weber, 1992, p. 109).
This gentle warning to the students about interpreting their forms of youthful fellowship in such
overblown terms as objective Geist was preceded by Weber’s forceful rejection of the youth-movement’s
demands that the scholarly vocation should be valued to the extent that it permitted the cultivation of an
authentic “personality” or gave expression to a heightened “experience” of life and spirit, rather than for
themastery of scholarly methods and expertise (ibidem, pp. 84–85). Inmaking such demands of academic
learning, under the pressures of war and political turbulence, the free-student groups were asking their
teachers to provide ultimate moral justifications for the scientific vocation, of the sort once provided by
religion and metaphysics. The Freistudenten had thus begun to look for cultural prophets and political
leaders in the lecture hall, where they found all too many academics prepared to abandon their offices as
teachers and researchers in order to step into these grandiloquent roles (ibidem, pp. 101–102).
Despite showing a limited sympathy for the student groupsmaking these demands—while none at all
for the “swindling” academics who sought to satisfy them—Weber’s response to his audience was uncom-
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promising. Acknowledging that the duty of an academic teacher cannot be “demonstrated scientifically”,
Weber continued:
One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see that it is one
thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure
of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the value of culture and
its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community
and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems. If [the teacher] asks
further why he should not deal with both types of problems in the lecture-room, the answer
is: because the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the podiumof the lecture-room.
(ibidem pp. 96–98)
The steely character of this response notwithstanding, it is important to observe that Weber regarded
the heterogeneity of scholarly knowledge and value-judgments not as a universal truth — grounded, for
example, in something like Kant’s distinction between the theoretical and practical dispositions of the in-
tellect — but as a feature of the “historical situation” in which academics were fated to find themselves,
hence as a product of the historical developments that had led to this situation.
In seeking to persuade his audience of the truth of the situation with which he confronted them, We-
ber abstracted from his detailed studies in the historical sociology of religion, law, and economy in or-
der to identify two broad developments whose transformation of western culture, he argued, had opened
the gap between the production of scientific knowledge and the making of cultural and political value-
commitments. First, starting with the Greeks, certain practices of conceptualization and computation
made it possible to approach nature as a domain of calculable entities. When combined with disciplined
forms of observation and experimentation developed during the Renaissance, this “rationalizing” or disci-
plining of intellectual conduct allowed the world to be viewed as open to technical knowledge and trans-
formation, hence as “disenchanted” in the sense of no longer being governed by divine or transcendent
forces open to magical knowledge and control. As a result, scientific knowledge had come to be governed
by methodological presuppositions internal to particular disciplines, which meant that it became impos-
sible to view science as the path to true knowledge of being or God, or thence to provide an overarching
value-justification for the scientific vocation, whose justifications became internal to acceptance of partic-
ular methodized disciplines (ibidem, pp. 88–93).
Second, in part because of the diverse modes and directions in which intellectual conduct had been
historically disciplined or rationalized, and in part because of more recent religious and political schisms,
it had become impossible to invoke any ultimate value-sphere that might be transcendentally justified or
else derived from a scientific account of culture or society. In a striking formulation that jolted many lead-
ing intellectuals, Weber thus declared that the “scientific” advocacy of ethical viewpoints is “meaningless
in principle, as the different values-spheres (Wertordnungen) of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict
with each other” (ibidem, p. 99). Flatly rejecting Kant’s claim to determine a universal moral law through
philosophical reflection, andHegel’s claim that suchwould arise from the social evolution of norms,Weber
told his audience that after the decay of Christian philosophical universalism the different ethics associated
with science, religion, politics and culture had assumed the form of a “war of the gods”, the outcomes of
which were dependent on fate not science, and where students had to make their own choices (ibidem,
pp. 100–101).
On the one hand, different disciplinary rationalizations of intellectual conduct had given rise to sci-
ences capable of empirical knowledge of the world on the basis of its methodological objectifications, free
of all value-judgments but thence incapable of ultimatemoral justification. On the other hand, the “disen-
chantment” of the forms of transcendent being that had once permitted Christianity and its metaphysics
to establish ultimate value-hierarchies meant that all value-spheres — culture, religion, politics, aesthetics
—were characterized by thewarring of ethical gods to be settled by combat not science. Thiswas the fateful
state of historical affairs that Weber demanded his audience face. He thus challenged the students to find
their scientific vocation and personality by mastering the methods of one of the specialized disciplines; to
renounce the pursuit of integrated personality and spiritual experience in the scientific domain; to refrain
from preaching cultural and political values in the lecture hall; and, should they choose to do so, to pursue
their political objectives in the separate domain of pitiless political combat — as Weber had done when
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seeking candidacy in the liberal German Democratic Party, and in his writings on the conduct of the war
and negotiations for peace.
It would be a significant misunderstanding, however, to presume Weber to have argued that because
the sciences are capable of producing value-free knowledge, they are themselves without values or have no
cultural meaning. In the first place, it is precisely because the empirical sciences are not based in objective
or true knowledge of being, but rather in a disciplined conduct of the intellect — one that permits it to
“objectify” a particular field of knowledge through the mastery of specific forms of conceptualization, cal-
culation, and evidence-gathering— thatWeber can treat scientific knowledge as involving the transmission
of particular ethos or conduct of life (Lebensführung). Avoiding normative judgments in scientific knowl-
edge thus requires transmitting ascetic norms that permit the formation of a methodologically ordered
and empirically grounded conduct of the intellect. In his essay on “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’
[Wertfreiheit] in Sociology and Economics” of 1917, Weber summarized these norms as: to fulfill a given
disciplinary task in a dedicated fashion; to recognize facts, especially those inconvenient for one’s own po-
sition, and distinguish them from value-judgments; and to subordinate oneself to the scientific task and
refrain from pushing one’s own values, tastes and sentiments (Weber, 1949, p. 5). In the vocation lecture,
Weber thus somewhat hesitantly characterized the cultivation of this scientific self-restraint as an “ethical
achievement” (ibidem, p. 99). Secondly, an academic can “clarify” the meaning of scientific teaching in
terms of the knowledge that it conveys regarding the rules of a specialist science, the immanent presupposi-
tions of the science, and the dependency of the rules on the presuppositions (ibidem, pp. 103–104). Finally,
by treating religious andmoral values scientifically— that is by investigating them as particular historically
conditioned ways of shaping conduct and viewing the world— the historical and social sciences can allow
these values to be approached independently of their truth or falsity, that is, value-neutrally, and hence in
an epistemic space able to be shared by those holding radically opposed religious and moral views, such as
a Catholic and a Freemason (ibidem, p. 98).
4 TheWar of the Gods
The left-Hegelian attack on Weber’s conception of value-free sociology formed only part of a wide and
diverse array of startled criticisms that his lecture triggered in the 1920s and 1930s (Lichtblau, 1996, pp. 392–
540). This array included Erich von Kahler’s prophetic demand that Weber’s separation of science and
values be overcome through the evolution of a new human spirit and body; Max Scheler’s insistence that
the required synthesis would be achieved through philosophy; and Heinrich Rickert’s sympathetic neo-
Kantian corrective, that philosophy could indeed still provide access to a transcendental truth lying beyond
the specialist sciences (see extracts in Lassman and Velody, 1989). By the 1960s, however, consolidated in
the work of the Frankfurt School, the left-Hegelian critique had become dominant.
If nothing else,MaxHorkheimer’s participation in the 1964Weber anniversarymeeting of theGerman
Sociological Congress demonstrated the remarkable continuity of German cultural-political factionalism;
for Horkheimer had been among the Munich students who heard Weber lecture, on the topic of Soviet
government, in 1919, the year before his death. No doubt tailoring his memories to the circumstances of
the 1960s, Horkheimer recalled that he and his fellow students had high hopes that Weber would present
an account of the Soviet attempt to forge a “better society”, providing them with a “theoretical reflection
and analysis […] whose every intellectual step would have led to a rational shaping of the future.” Instead,
“Everything was so precise, so scientifically austere, so value-free, that we went home completely gloomy.”
Still, all was not lost, for Weber’s conception of value-free sociology — which Horkheimer understood as
restricting investigation to the instrumental means used to achieve presupposed ends—was undermined
by the fact of Weber’s conflict with the conservative student corporations. This showed to Horkheimer’s
satisfaction that Weber’s sociology was not really value-free, and that “sociology cannot be so completely
divorced from philosophical obligation” (Horkheimer, 1971, pp. 51–53).
Horkheimer’s anecdotes expressed the political commitments andmetaphysics of the Schwab and Ben-
jamin generation, and did so by invoking the role of sociology in a “rational shaping of the future” that
Weber had inveighed against in his 1917 vocation lecture. At the same time, his remarks also reflected the
increased academic influence that this kind of “social metaphysics” had gained during the interwar years,
and then again after the hiatus of the war. This influence was due not least to the endowment of an in-
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stitution for the specific purpose of teaching Marxist and left-Hegelian doctrine, the Institute for Social
Research or “Frankfurt School”, directed by Horkheimer in the early 1930s, and to which he returned
fromAmerican exile after its re-establishment in 1950. It was left to the leading representative of the Frank-
furt School’s second generation — Horkheimer’s former student Jürgen Habermas — to formulate the
left-Hegelian counter-attack on Weber’s conception of value-free social science, providing a template for
the anti-Weberian academic cultural politics of the 1960s that remains in full cry today.
Habermas’s central strategy was to treat Weber’s historical and sociological studies as a general theory
of society — no doubt assisted by the postwar American reception of Weber in these terms (Tribe, 1988)
— and hence as accountable to a philosophical history of the kind found in Hegelianism and Marxism.
Since the rise of 1830sHegelianism, this kind of philosophical history had allowed its adherents to conceive
society as a dialectical whole, evolving through the manner in which the forms of rationality (ideas) to
which it gives rise have the possibility of grasping their own social determination andhence bringing society
under the sway of rationally groundednorms (Simon, 1928, pp. 156–184). According toHabermas,Weber’s
studies in the sociology of law, bureaucracy, religion and economy were all grounded in an underlying
philosophical history of the progressive “rationalization” of all spheres of social life, with this conception
providing the unacknowledgednormative grounding ofWeberian sociology and the key to its hermeneutic
operation (Habermas, 1971, p. 62; 1981, pp. 157–185).
IgnoringWeber’s repeated warnings that rationalization did not refer to a general process, and that dif-
ferent spheres of life were rationalized in quite different directions, using different means and for different
purposes, Habermas taggedWeber with a single general philosophical-historical conception of rationaliza-
tion: namely, the use of instrumentally rational means (Zweckrationalität) in order to realize ends that
were presupposed for purely technical purposes. This allowed Habermas to argue that Weber’s social the-
ory was stranded between an objective account of social relations governed by technical rationality and
a subjectivist conception of normative ends for which no social basis or justification could be provided,
leaving him at themercy of a politically dangerous decisionism. Habermas’sWeber lacked a dialectical con-
ception of the relation between social relations and rationality, according to which socially-determined
reason becomes conscious of its own determination (as the estranged form of social relations) freeing it for
a moral governance of society. As a result, this Weber had committed himself to an instrumental concep-
tion of rationality that reduced sociology to the production of “technically utilizable knowledge” and left
social and political norms in the domain of arbitrary choice and charismatic imposition (Habermas, 1971,
pp. 63–65).
Placed in this alien intellectual context, Weber’s account of the emergence of empirical sciences from
the conceptual and experimental disciplining of intellectual conduct lost its historical character. By assimi-
lating it to a general theory of social rationalization—but one that lacked a properly dialectical account of
the relation between ideal norms and social reality—Habermas could treatWeber’s historical sociology of
the value-free sciences as a disguised expression of the latter’s own value-commitment to technical reason
and subjectivized morality:
This is also the context in which the academic-political demand for value-freedom has its par-
ticular significance. The empirical sciences (Erfahrungswissenschaften) are part of the general
process of rationalization in a two-fold manner. They have disenchanted the world and de-
prived action-orienting values and norms of their claim to objective validity. To this extent
they have altogether ceded pride of place to individual decision between subjectivized faith-
factions (Glaubensmächten). On the other hand, like bureaucracy, the empirical sciences also
tend to usurp the space of decision that they initially opened, which means that they must be
restricted to the role of technical aids. (Habermas, 1971, pp. 64–65).
In other words, rather than being an ineluctable feature of the “historical situation”, forHabermas the
difference that Weber called on his students to confront — the difference between knowing an historical
phenomenon on the basis of an empirical science, and evaluating it on the basis of cultural, political or
religious norms—was actually a product ofWeber’s own failure to commit to a dialectical theory of society.
As outlined in Habermas’s extraordinarily sophisticated magnum opus, this was a theory in which social
relations would give rise to a form of intersubjective or “communicative” rationality that was capable of
determining social agreement on ultimate norms for politics and society. A professor of sociology could
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then proclaim these norms to students, speaking as the voice of social reason (Habermas, 1981, pp. 8–42&
273–338).
In discussing the character of this critique it is necessary to begin by observing that Habermas makes
no attempt to show the empirical inaccuracy of any of Weber’s particular studies — of bureaucracy, law,
ascetic Protestantism, the economic ethics of the world religions— because his objective is to reject Webe-
rian empirical historical sociology as such. Habermas’s criticism ofWeber’s Protestant Ethic thus does not
question the accuracy of Weber’s account of the role of ascetic Protestantism in producing an “irrational”
methodizing of life in pursuit of signs of grace. Rather, Weber is taken to task for failing to grasp the role
of this Protestantism in the great dialectic between “social structure” and “social consciousness”. In fact
Habermas convicted Protestantism itself of failing to mediate this dialectic, arguing that it had failed to
realize the normative and rational horizons that had been opened by the destruction of the traditional
“mythic” cosmos. Instead, it had closed these horizons within an irrational ascetic lifestyle, which Weber
merely described, thence failing to grasp ascetic Protestantism’s deeper philosophical-historical meaning
(Habermas, 1981, pp. 220–228).
In thus refusing to engageWeber’s account on a shared intellectual ground formed by common norms
of empirical validity — and instead diagnosing Weber himself as a symptom of Protestantism’s supposed
failure to mediate social structure and social consciousness in a communicative social understanding —
Habermas did not treat Weber as a dialogue partner engaged in a shared process of understanding and
norm-formation. Rather, he interpreted Weber’s value-free empirical account of ascetic Protestantism as
excluding its author from the great dialectical conversation through which society had been clarifying its
own normative grounds. This meant that Weber’s empirical approach had to be relinquished before its
author could be admitted to the “dialogical” space of the Frankfurt School, inwhich ultimate valueswould
be derived from a special kind of social theory.
Rather than attempting to engage with Weber’s conception of value-freedom on the basis of shared
norms of knowledge, Habermas’s account was thus designed to eliminate it from discussion and replace
it with a factional social metaphysics. First emerging as a cultural-political movement in the form of 1830s
Hegelian philosophical history (Simon, 1928, pp. 156–184), this metaphysics had played an important role
in the formation of right- and left-Hegelian political sects surrounding the 1848 revolution (Stedman Jones,
2011), before flowing into the studentmovement addressed byWeber in his 1917 vocation lecture, and then
finding institutional embodiment in the Frankfurt School that had been richly endowed by partisans in
the 1924 (Wiggershaus, 1995, pp. 9–40). In order to demonstrate this case it is first necessary to remove
Weber’s conception of value-free empirical knowledge from the dialectical account in which the Frankfurt
School sought to inter it. Thiswill indeed entail showing thatWeber’s conceptionof value-freedom is quite
unlike the account that Habermas provides of it, but the ultimate purpose of this demonstration will not
be to falsify that account. Instead, it will be to show that rather than offering a (falsifiable) description of
Weber’s conception, Habermas’s account was an intellectual weapon designed to supplant it on behalf of
a hostile cultural-political faction.
The first observation to make in this regard is that Weber’s conception of rationalization was not the
object of a general theory, grounded in a philosophical history comparable with Hegelianism orMarxism,
and assuming the single general form of an instrumentalized technical rationality. As Wilhelm Hennis
in particular has shown, Weber dispersed rationalization across a number of particular studies, treating it
not as a general idea or form of reason, but as a diverse array of intellectual practices for the ordering and
disciplining — thus “rationalizing” — of inner and outer forms of conduct (Hennis, 1988, pp. 23–24 &
38–46). In the context of his discussion of the Protestant ethic, Weber thus famously wrote that:
A simple sentence should stand at the center of every study that delves into “rationalism”. It
must not be forgotten that one can in fact “rationalize” life from a vast variety of ultimate van-
tage points. Moreover, one can do so in very different directions. “Rationalism” is a historical
concept that contains within itself a world of contradictions. […]What interestsus here is pre-
cisely the ancestral lineage of that irrational element which lies in this, as in every, conception
of a “calling”. (Weber, 2011, p. 98).
The impropriety of tying Weber to a philosophical history of the spread of an instrumentalized tech-
nical rationalism becomes particularly apparent from his account of the rationalization of life under the
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regime of “ascetic Protestantism”. Here, far from viewing it in terms of the instrumental realization of
presupposed technical goals, Weber treats rationalization as a regime of life centered on the “irrational”
Calvinist doctrine of predestination. He argues that in dealing with the anxiety regarding salvation in-
duced by this doctrine, the Calvinist faithful were advised to consider themselves as among the elect, and
thence to search for the signs of their election not in the sacraments of a church, but in their everyday con-
duct (Weber, 2011, pp. 115–137). As a result, the daily life of Calvinists became the object of intense ascetic
scrutiny and disciplining, leading to a characteristic rationalization of inner and outer conduct. Rather
than being the instrumental means of reaching a technical objective, this rationalizing or disciplining was
a spiritual exercise aimed at transforming the self in order to attain an “irrational” spiritual condition.
From this we can derive a second observation. It is a central feature ofWeber’s conception of value-free
empirical knowledge that forms of reasoning and ethical norms are not viewed as ideas that might be true
or false, or as “social consciousness” that might dialectically reflect a separate domain of “material” social
relations. In fact it is a point of maximum difference betweenWeber and the Frankfurt School that he did
not treat forms of reasoning and ethics in accordance with the latter’s dialectical— ideal-material— ontol-
ogy but in a completely different way: namely, as intellectual actions or modes of conducting the intellect
in the course of leading a particular kind of life, or what Weber called Lebensführungen — conducts of
life. Weber thus approached the Calvinist doctrine of predestination neither as a true or false theological
idea, nor as a distorted ideational reflection of capitalist social relations. Rather, he described it as a means
of self-problematization that establishes a new relation to the self — in terms of radical inner uncertainty
regarding one’s state of grace— and inaugurates a highly disciplined way of conducting the self in order to
secure the signs of grace in daily life. In this regard, Weber’s empirical treatment of ethics and rationality
as modes of self-conduct is strikingly similar toMichel Foucault’s late approach to ethics through a history
of “practices of the self”— arts of ethical problematization and self-transformation carried out as a “work
of the self on the self” — as recent studies have illuminated (Gordon, 2014).
In the essay on “the meaning of value-freedom in the sociological and economic sciences” that he pub-
lished in the same year as the “Science as a Vocation” lecture, Weber formulated this approach in a core
methodological protocol. Here he stated that the empirical sciences transformed normatively valid truths
(in ethics, philosophy, theology, mathematics) into describable social phenomena by treating them not as
manifestations of transcendental ideas or norms but as types of conduct. Thus, “When the normatively
valid is the object of empirical investigation, it loses its character as a norm, and is treated in terms of its
‘existence’ and not its ‘validity’ ” (Weber, 1949, p. 39). As a result, “Every science of intellectual or social
relations is a science of human conduct (Sichverhalten), (such that all acts of thought and all psychological
attitudes fall under this concept)” (Weber, 1949, p. 40). In other words, ethical, intellectual, and social
phenomena could be approached independently of their normative validity — that is, value-neutrally —
by transforming them into forms of human conduct or comportment open to historical and sociological
investigation and description.
Third, it thus becomes clear that Weber’s conception of value-free historical and social sciences came
not from the fact that he too was caught up in the spread of instrumental technical rationality — leav-
ing him at the mercy of moral subjectivism and decisionism— but from quite different historical sources:
namely, from the highly various methods of conceptualization, calculation, interpretation, observation
and experiment through which particular phenomena had been transformed into objects of empirical de-
scription and interpretation in various fields, as exemplified in the historical transformation of ethics and
religion into describable forms of human conduct. Weber regarded these methods neither as Kantian tran-
scendental conditions of possible experience, nor as Hegelianized versions of these, such as proposed in
Habermas’s conception of idealized social dialogue as the source of universally (intersubjectively) valid
norms of social knowledge and action. Rather, he viewed scientific rationality too as a form of intellectual
conduct, treating its methods as practices of the self whose combined ethical and technical disciplining of
intellectual activities — mathematical calculation, experimental observation, philological interpretation,
historical contextualization, and so on— permitted the objectification of particular fields of phenomena.
It has already been observed thatWeber regarded the adoption of a value-free empirical stance as depen-
dent on the historical and pedagogical transmission of certain ethical disciplines and abilities: to doggedly
master scientific tasks and methods, to discipline oneself to recognize facts, particularly “inconvenient
facts”, and to refrain from projecting one’s value-commitments into fields of empirical investigation (We-
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ber, 1949, p. 5). In the face of demands like Benjamin’s call for a supra-disciplinary spiritual “experience”,
and Schwab’s call to repudiate Beruf in favor of the integration of “ideas” and “life” in a authentic “per-
sonality”, Weber insisted that the vocation and personality of the scientist consisted in the self-restraining
mastery of a specific set of ethical and technical abilities. These belonged not to an objective Geist embod-
ied in humanity, but to the historically specific personality of the professional scientist: “Thus it would be
to deprive ‘vocation’ of its only really important remaining meaning were one not to perform the specific
type of self-restraint that it requires” (Weber, 1949, p. 6).
5 The Sociology of Religion and Philosophical Faith
Rather than devolving from a general technical rationality lacking normative grounds, Weber’s value-free
investigations arose from methods for historicizing ethical phenomena that were historically specific and
dependent on the ethical and technical disciplining of the investigator’s intellectual conduct. Limiting our
attention to the intellectualmeans thatWeber used to investigate religions in a value-freemanner— that is,
the means that made it possible to view religions in terms of the historical “existence” of ascetic disciplines
and modes of conducting the self, setting aside their “normative validity” — it can be observed that he
derived these from the disciplines of ecclesiastical history and the history of theology. In the annotated
bibliographical footnote 10 tohis discussionof asceticCalvinism in theProtestant Ethic,Weber listed a large
number of his sources from these disciplines— including specialist works byKampschulte, Fruin, Nuyens
andKöhler andmore famous studies byRanke, Troeltsch, Carlyle,Macaulay andMasson—whichhe cited
both as authorities and also as the means by which readers could verify his account (Weber, 2011, pp. 321–
322).
Of particular significance for our present concerns is a work that Weber cites as one of his key sources:
Matthias Schneckenburger’s lectures comparing Calvinist and Lutheran theological doctrines. For Sch-
neckenburger had presented these lectures in the 1840s when the Prussian government’s attempt to unify
the twoProtestant confessions hadprovoked furious religious debate as to the nature of true Protestantism
(Clark, 1996; 2000). In seeking to distance himself from this debate and adopt an “impartial” viewpoint,
Schneckenburger declared that hewould describe theological doctrines— including the Calvinist doctrine
of predestination— independently of their truth or falsity, and that he would do so by approaching them
historically, in terms of their psychological effects on the conduct of their adherents (Schneckenburger,
1855, pp. 34–37).
In thus proposing to withdraw from irresolvable conflicts over religious truth, and to approach reli-
gions value-neutrally, as a plurality of historical forms of psychological or spiritual discipline, Schnecken-
burger’s account channeled the empiricalmethods of “erudite” ecclesiastical and theological history. These
methods for suspending the transcendent meaning and truth of religious texts and doctrines, and treating
themas records of purely humanhistorical activities, had first beendeveloped for the purposes of Sixteenth-
and Seventeenth-century biblical criticism and ecclesiastical history. Here their capacity to suspend reli-
gious meaning and truth, and to treat religions as historical phenomena, had been put to a variety of cross-
cutting uses — to claim apostolic lineage, attack metaphysical theology, relativize and pluralize religions
for the purposes of juridical pacification—without however losing their power to constitute religion as an
object of trans-confessional scientific scholarship (Backus, 2003; Lehmann-Brauns, 2004; Levitin, 2012). In
citing Schneckenburger as a key source, Weber was thus signaling that his value-free sociology of religion
could be regarded as borrowing the methods of empirical historicization and distantiation that had per-
mitted early modern ecclesiastical and theological historiographies to approach religions in terms of their
existence rather than their truth, under conditions of radical religious conflict.
The fact that they were embedded in specialized (and permanently contested) historicizing and neu-
tralizing disciplines, however, meant that the scientific and ethical norms underpinning the value-free so-
ciology of religion could not themselves be “scientifically” justified or advocated. In providing the ethical
and scientific techniques that permitted sacred texts to be interpreted as records of wholly human activi-
ties related to the cultivation of religious styles of life, biblical criticism and ecclesiastical history had indeed
opened up religions to empirical modes of investigation. In doing so solely by disciplining and specializ-
ing the intellectual conduct and comportment of the religious scholar, however, the normative outlook
associated with such empirical disciplines could not be justified in terms of a universal or transcendental
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rationality and normativity. Rather than being part of an epochal rationalization or secularization of cul-
ture and society, this was the outlook only of those whose specialized intellectual and ethical disciplining
allowed them to view religions as historical phenomena independently of their truth or falsity. To adopt
this viewpoint it was thus not necessary that the spiritual beliefs of all religious adherents should undergo
some kind of epochal rational transformation, as it was if their intersubjective agreement were viewed as
the source of universal norms of communicative reason. All that was required, rather, was that the reli-
gious beliefs and commitments of those undertaking scientific work should be suspended for the purposes
and duration of historical investigation and description.
Despite thus denying that “empirical-psychological andhistorical analysis” of religious ethics couldpro-
vide a universal evaluation of them,Weber nonetheless argued that such a verstehende Erklärung or inter-
pretive explanation could be supplied with a non-transcendental justification. This was not least because
by allowing religions to be viewed as historical ethical comportments, this approach permitted commu-
nication between scholars who otherwise adhered to radically opposed religious or ethical beliefs (Weber,
1949, pp. 13–14; 1992, p. 98). At the same time, the adoption of this distantiated outlook could not be com-
pelled by rationally binding social norms— such as those that Habermas claims arise from idealized social
dialogue— since the outlook is internal to the ethical and intellectual disciplines of the scientific conduct
of life. This means that should religious believers, whose life-conduct is shaped by quite another kind of
spiritual discipline, refuse to adopt the empirical disciplines that would turn their beliefs into historical
phenomena, then the scientific approach cannot produce norms capable of invalidating their stance.
At this point the professor should not attempt to draw an evaluation of religious conduct from a
philosophical-historical or social-theoretical account of it, for to presume that the scientific outlook could
itself be scientifically justified would be to cross the line into prophecy and demagogy. The choice to be
made under such circumstances cannot be scientifically or rationally determined, since “the ultimate possi-
ble attitudes toward life are irreconcilable and their struggles irresolvable,” and the scientific comportment
or vocation is itself one of these. At this point, all that a professor can do is exhort his students to have the
“integrity” to recognize the difference between describing ethical and religious conducts as historical phe-
nomena and evaluating them in termsof their normative validity—the central purpose ofWeber’s “Science
as a Vocation” lecture — leaving them to make their own religious and ethical valuations on the basis of
“personal” commitments, independent of their scientific training and vocation (Weber, 1992, pp. 104–105).
The views held by Schwab, Benjamin and Horkheimer in 1917-1920 testify to the fact that many of
the ears on which Weber’s exhortation fell were quite deaf to it, as do the views held by Horkheimer and
Habermas in the 1960s. Listening as theywere to the voice of objective Geist, the intellectual senses of these
thinkers were not tuned by the methods of empirical ecclesiastical history to the presence of religion as an
historical phenomenon. Rather their attention was focused by a another kind of intellectual discipline
altogether. This was supplied by the metaphysical philosophies and philosophical histories of Kant and
Hegel, which, since the 1830s had shown how religions could be treated in a quite different, philosophical-
historical manner: namely, as partial manifestations of transcendental rational norms by which they could
also be evaluated.
Turning their backs on empirical ecclesiastical historiographies, Kant and Hegel had portrayed the ri-
val confessional religions—what Kant called the “empirical” or “historical” religions andHegel “determi-
nate” or “positive” religion— as historical manifestations of an underlying transcendental reason or spirit
(Hegel, 1988, pp. 391–413; Kant, 2009, pp. 113–120). While they had been needed to guide humanity during
its period of rational immaturity, Kant and Hegel taught that the historical and positive confessional reli-
gions were destined to be transformed into forms of rational-moral self-governance or pure spiritual self-
consciousness. This would happen through a dialectical philosophical history that would progressively
purify (sublate) the merely statutory, inculcatory and historical form of religion— essentially the story of
Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection in atonement for human sin — while simultaneously trans-
posing religion’s universal norms into the register of transcendental moral philosophy, the “pure religion
of reason”, or a “communal spiritual consciousness” that would supersede religion as the highest stage of
humanmorality. (Hegel, 1988, pp. 470–489; Kant, 2009, pp. 120–137). From this perspective it was not the
specialist empirical disciplines of ecclesiastical and theological history that constituted confessional religion
as an object of “rational” knowledge for scholarly purposes, otherwise leaving it intact for believers. Rather
it was human reason itself, as voiced through Kantian-Hegelian philosophy and philosophical history. In
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treating historical religions as the estranged forms in which transcendental reason or the world spirit had
manifested itself in time, this style of philosophy simultaneously prophesied the complete supersession
or Aufhebung of these religions. This would see the transfer of their normative contents to philosophy
itself, and the transformation of religious believers into “rational beings” and democratic citizens — an
eschatology whose fulfillment is still awaited.
The price to be paid for this powerful rationalization of religion, however, was that Kantian and
Hegelian philosophical histories of religion were themselves received, positively and negatively, as
heterodox (pantheist, pelagian, rationalist) forms of religion (Scheidler, 1846; Hundeshagen, 1850), or as
philosophical confessions in competition with Germany’s constitutionally recognized public religions
(Hunter, 2005). This was in part because the anthropology and cosmology underpinning Kantian
and Hegelian philosophies — the image of man as a double-sided rational and sensuous being whose
dialectical purification would lead to intersubjective moral community — had been borrowed from
Christian metaphysics and eschatology, making it difficult for many to regard these philosophies as
fundamentally different from the confessional religions that they purported to supersede (Hunter, 2001,
pp. 279–315; 2002; 2018). And it was in part because they were transmitted as a factional cultural politics
or “fourth confession”, in competition with both the three constitutional religions, and the empirical
historiographies and sociologies that historicized religion in a non-philosophical manner (Weir, 2014).
Like the Kantian andHegelian philosophies onwhich it is based, Habermas’s sociology (or social meta-
physics) of religious and ethical cultures is also characterized by the eschewal of empirical ecclesiastical and
theological history and by the direct transposition of Kantian, Hegelian andMarxian views— of religions
as manifestations of an underlying “ethical totality” — into the register of the theory of communicative
reason. Habermas has helpfully summarized this transposition thus:
WithHegel andMarx, itwouldhave been amatter of not swallowing the intuition concerning
the ethical totality back into the horizon of the self-reference of the knowing and acting sub-
ject, but of explicating it in accord with the model of unconstrained consensus formation in a
communication community standing under cooperative constraints (Habermas, 1987, p. 295).
ForHabermaswhat permits religions to be approached rationally is not the use of empiricalmethods to
constitute them as historical life-conducts (Lebensführungen) and life-orders (Lebensordnungen), but the
use of a philosophical image of them as the partially estranged historical manifestations of a transcendental
world of norms and meanings that he calls the “life-world” (Lebenswelt) (Habermas, 2001, pp. 36–41). As
a modestly attired presentation of Hegel’s objective Geist or world spirit, Habermas’s life-world permits
him to approach religions not in a value-neutral way, as autonomous historical “practices of the self”, but
in a value-prophetic manner, as estranged expressions of an “ethical totality” that will be realized through
them in accordance with a philosophical-historical dialectic.
On this view, on the one hand, as purely empirical historical phenomena, the confessional religions
are characterized as belief systems whose conflictual autonomy arises from their failure to reflexively re-
cover their transcendental-rational underpinnings; but, on the other hand, as estranged expressions of the
life-world’s common transcendental norms of reason andmorality, the religions have the potential to ratio-
nalize (sublate) themselves and unite in the intersubjective retrieval of a once and future common moral
world (Habermas, 2006, pp. 9–16). Using Kant as his exemplar, Habermas has declared that this trans-
formation is being driven by an “Enlightenment” dialectic in which partisan religious adherents modify
their particularistic confessions in order to enter a space of rational dialogue with their opponents. At
the same time, an otherwise technical rationality is being morally transformed by absorbing the universal
norms of intersubjective moral community that were previously the province of the religious confessions
(Habermas, 2003, pp. 101–115). Habermas thus regards the dialectical rationalization of religious morality
and moralization of technical reason as overcoming religious division by ushering in a new level of moral
consciousness (Habermas, 2001, pp. 30–45). It will be recalled that this is the same dialectical philosophi-
cal history that the Frankfurt School has routinized in order to trap and dismember Weber. It thus never
grows old for commentators to rehearse that on the one hand Weber’s value-free historical sociology is a
slave to technical rationality, while on the other hand his ethical pluralism is a symptom of his failure to
engage in the dialogical process throughwhich society itself is producing themoral consciousness bywhich
it can be understood and evaluated (Benhabib, 1981; Eich & Tooze, 2017).
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It has already been shown that Weber’s value-free approach to religions and his value-pluralism are
quite unlikeHabermas’s account of them. Weber’s value-free religious sociology derivednot from technical
reason but from his appropriation of the methods of empirical ecclesiastical and theological history. And
Weber’s value-pluralism arose not from some putative failure of transcendental moral reflexivity, but from
his “Nietzchean” argument that the various (and often contradictory) rationalizations of different spheres
of life had “disenchanted” the world in the sense of undermining the kind of transcendental normative
grounding that had once been supplied byChristianity and post-Christianmetaphysical philosophies such
as Kantianism andHegelianism. It now remains to be shown that Habermas’s critique does not provide a
falsifiable account ofWeber’s historical sociology because the theory of communicative reason fromwhich
it is launched is actually a transposed form of the Kantian-Hegelian “philosophical religion”, designed to
function as a kind of academic confession and serve as a factional cultural politics.
Habermas is well aware of the danger of his ownposition being regarded as a “philosophical faith”, and
he attempts to forestall this by declaring that his doctrine of communicative reason is actually a “formal
theory”; that is, a theory based on the reflexive recovery of the universal form of moral reasoning — the
dialogical determination of norms in an ideal speech situation— rather than advocacy for a particular sub-
stantivemorality or cultural politics (Habermas, 2001, pp. 39–41). If we viewHabermas’s ethics of commu-
nicative reason as a particular historical way of conducting the intellect (a Lebensführung), however, then
there are several formidable obstacles that make it impossible to understand it as a formal theory in this
sense. In the first place, until shown otherwise, it seems clear that Habermas’s account of dialogical ethical
reasoning is grounded in a substantive or “comprehensive” metaphysical cosmology and anthropology, in
fact transposed from Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics as already indicated. Habermas’s image of a cos-
mic life-world, conceived as the single unifying source of all transcendental concepts and norms, and thus
avowedly lying beyond all empirical validation, can only draw its authority from the sheer inculcation of
the Kantian anthropology of rational humanity and theHegelian-Marxian cosmology of the self-evolving
world spirit, placing it amongWeber’s irreconcilable “ultimate possible attitudes toward life.”
Second, it can be observed that the role of this metaphysical anthropology and cosmology is to inaugu-
rate a particular way of relating to and conducting a self. Just as Calvinist predestination initiates a specific
inner anxiety over election that is overcome via “this-worldly asceticism”, so too Habermas’s dialectic of
life-world and technical rationality is a means of initiating a particular kind of intellectual anxiety: namely,
an inner anxiety over whether the empirical autonomy of the sciences is destroying the transcendental
normative unity of human reason and intersubjective community, for which the social theorist thus feels
personally responsible:
It is the task of critique to recognize domination as unreconciled nature even within thought
itself. But even if thought had mastered the idea of reconciliation […] How could it do so if
thought is always […] tied to operations that have no specifiable meaning outside the bounds
of instrumental reason […]? (Habermas, 1981, p. 384).
The Frankfurt School’s positing of a stalledmediation between a technical rationality and a fragmented
decisionistmorality can thus be understood as a particular practice of ethical self-problematization—a spe-
cific way of relating to the self as in need of ethical attention andwork. Seen in this light, the philosophical-
historical dialectic — as performed, for example, in the exercise of retrieving the imaginal transcendental-
rational core of religions, while imbuing technical rationality with the now-rationalized religious norms of
moral community— can be understood as a type of intellectual ascesis, or ethical “work of the self on the
self” that certain academic intellectuals are called on to perform on themselves. This work is performed
in order to realize a particular “ethical telos” or higher form of moral consciousness or self: one that is ca-
pable of prophetic insight into the future return of a metaphysically unified life-world after the period of
technical fragmentation and “system”.
The third and final indicator of the “confessional” character of Habermas’s theory of communicative
reason is the polemical and sectarian character of the cultural politics to which it gives rise. It has already
been shown thatHabermas’s critique ofWeber’s value-free historical sociology is incapable of engaging it in
a “de-confessionalized” space of empirical understanding. This is becauseHabermas’s depiction ofWeber’s
sociology as grounded in an instrumentalized technical rationality is wholly internal to the philosophical
dialectic as the spiritual exercise of a particular academic faction. Here, Weber’s “one-sidedness” is an icon
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for a moral failure that threatens the recovery of transcendental moral unity and hence the Habermasian’s
personal ethical equilibrium. It is for this reason that Weber’s value-free sociology “must” symbolize the
threat of technical rationality, just as his value-pluralism “must” threaten a decisionist fragmentation of
moral community; for these are threats that the Habermasian theorist conjures in himself, as part of the
inner exercise for cultivating the unified ethical comportment that is the ethical telos for a sectarian cultural
politics and way of academic life.
6 Conclusion
The relationship betweenWeber’s value-free sociology and the Frankfurt School critique of it should itself
be regarded as a striking exemplificationofWeber’s account of the irreconcilability of the “ultimate possible
attitudes toward life.” In treating it as stranded between a technical rationality and a decisionist ethics,
Habermas’s account ofWeber’s sociology can neither be validated nor falsified, for that account is internal
to the operation of left-Hegelianism as a type of academic self-cultivation. Here its role is to induce a
specialized intellectual anxiety in the theorist, and thence to initiate the dialectic as a spiritual exercise aimed
at the recovery of imaginal ultimate social norms from dialogical self-reflection.
In providing a “scientific” historical description of Frankfurt School social philosophy as a particular
ascetic discipline for relating to and conducting an ethical self, this essay does not presume that such a
description can itself be scientifically or normatively justified, for the reasons outlined above. As Weber
argued in the central message of “Science as a Vocation”, the best that a scholar can do in this regard is to
exhort an academic audience to have the intellectual integrity to see that describing an ethical regimen as a
type of conduct, and valuing it as the highest form of moral consciousness, are quite heterogeneous ways
of conducting the intellect, and that only the former belongs in the lecture-hall. That such an exhortation
will in many cases fall on deaf ears is itself a central feature of the historical situation in which academics
continue to find themselves.
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